The sudden resignation of Shinzo Abe, the longest-serving Prime Minister of Japan, due to health reasons could impact Japan’s relations with some countries unpredictably. Abe had not only nurtured Japan’s new-age policy with nuanced revisionism but also established personal connections with world leaders, imparting predictability and trust in relationships. The Abe-Modi friendship signified one such leadership bond.
Although Abe’s long reign at the helm and cordial relations with India seems to have provided a solid platform to provide stability even in his absence, how will the long- term relations between India and Japan shape up post-Abe, and more specifically under his successor? Yoshihide Suga, who was on Monday elected the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, is set to succeed Abe as Japan’s PM.
The Modi-Abe chemistry has been variously described as one between ‘friends’ or ‘old friends’. Abe’s strong India-tilt precedes Modi. It hit an unprecedented high with his famous “Confluence of the Two Seas” address to the Indian Parliament in 2007, but the relationship achieved newer heights under Modi-Abe. The two leaders met for the first time in September 2014 and concurred on elevating ties to a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.”
The December 2015 visit of Prime Minister Abe to India kickstarted the broadbasing of bilateral ties, with an action-oriented and long-term approach to political, economic and strategic goals. The two leaders announced the “Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership — Working together for peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and the world,” a joint statement that would serve as a guidepost for a “new era in Japan-India relations.” In a rare gesture, in 2018, Abe hosted Modi for a private dinner at his holiday home in Yamanashi Prefecture.
Abe’s leadership provided India with a confident partner to broaden its Indo-Pacific strategy, by geographically including the vast region between the Far East and the African continent. The Indo-Pacific strategy has enabled both countries to expand the scope of their cooperation by expanding the scope beyond Japanese O!icial Development Assistance (ODA), which has been a mainstay of bilateral cooperation since 1958.
The India-Japan partnership in the Indo-Pacific today relies on working together to promote peace, stability and prosperity through economic growth and development in the region, including Africa, by enhancing connectivity through quality infrastructure and capacity-building. The bilateral partnership in the Indo-Pacific gained new ground under Abe-Modi as their joint development partnership now concerns a host of other countries in the region: Sri Lanka for the development of LNG-related infrastructure, Myanmar for multifaceted development assistance in Rakhine State, Bangladesh for roads, bridges and railway, as well as a comprehensive focus on the socio-economic development of the African continent.
The Indo-Pacific partnership between Japan and India has also strengthened the security partnership between the two sides and that is likely to continue under Abe’s successor. The 2015 induction of Japan into the Malabar naval exercises as a permanent member has opened up new fronts for enhancing interoperability and cooperation for security in the maritime domain. Besides, multilateral cooperative mechanisms like the Japan-America-India Trilateral Meeting (JAI), the Quad, and the Quad Plus have all expanded scope for regional cooperation.
Multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has risen in utility for both Japan and India as they not only ensure regional security and provide necessary political signalling, but also keep the regional balance of power in check. This is important in the context of Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, its territorial and historical disputes with Japan, and its desire to increase its footprint in the Indian Ocean Region.
As Japan and India try to navigate the troubled waters of the Indo-Pacific, a sustained cooperation from the Abe-era should continue under his successor, both in bilateral relations and regional priorities. His successor should also continue the purposeful nuance that Abe maintained vis-a-vis China through a mix of nationalistically driven defence policy, international cooperation and yet a measured approach in dealing with China.
The departure of Abe could see a shi” in Japan’s designs to recruit India back to the negotiating table on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a proposed free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region between the 10 member states of ASEAN and its free trade partners, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. India withdrew from RCEP over concerns about its trade deficit with China, a situation that has been compounded by the ongoing border stando!with China.
Other ASEAN countries are also keen to have India back in the RCEP fold, particularly Indonesia, which depends on India and China to buy its palm oil. Abe’s strong relationship with Modi was seen as essential to getting India to rejoin negotiations, although the “door” will still remain open for India in the near future.
Among the many questions still outstanding are those concerning the future of the Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which emerged from the Modi-Abe friendship in November 2016. The AAGC envisions a sustainable growth strategy through a series of consultations and partnerships across Asia and Africa. It has been seen as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has caused anxiety in the developing world over concerns about being tied to Chinese credit.
The AAGC focuses on development cooperation, infrastructure development, connectivity and developing capacities and it could benefit the wider region by expanding the value chain and creating new channels of production, as well as movement of goods across the Indo-Pacific. Japan needs AAGC because it is very resource-poor and India, while having some deposits of minerals, lacks the fossil fuels needed to boost its economy and support its large population. Neither can afford to miss out on Africa and its growth.
While Abe’s successor is unlikely to rock the boat that Abe and Modi built, the last time Abe resigned due to illness brought about significant change. This time, the LDP remains Japan’s dominant political party and that could ensure continuity. Japan’s emergence as a middle power coincided with India’s rise to prominence in the Indo-Pacific. A small shock to the system is unlikely to undermine its dynamic.
My co-author, Dr. Vivek Mishra is the Deputy Director of the Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies, based in Bhubaneswar, India.
