ASEAN, by principle, is supposed to be wary of alignments. But as more Southeast Asian leaders push engagement with BRICS members China and Russia, the more the bloc inches further into risky or unnecessary geopolitical friction. Case in point was the Philippines, whose tensions with China in the South China Sea have reached an all-time high, whose leader stood inches from Xi Jinping. Indonesia and Malaysia have gone a step further, with the former attending as a full member. Malaysia and Thailand have increased engagement while Thailand sent its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sihasak Phuangketkeow.
While much has been written about the net benefits of additional engagement with regional powers, less seems to be said about the risks associated with losing what Southeast Asian states have had: the appearance or veneer of ambiguity. ASEAN is stronger when it can be useful, if not critical in their respective non-alignment. The region is entering a new phase of strategic competition, from defense cooperation, AI governance, and supply chain efficiency. And amid that competition comes danger, as the United States becomes less predictable and far more transactional. It was just a year ago when Trump threatened the region with additional tariffs due to the anti-American politics of BRICS.
And even when Trump is at his most mercurial, evidenced in his lack of support to ASEAN states when energy prices reached emergency levels, it was foolish for Thailand’s Sihasak to complain about the lack of US help. And now for Thailand to make a grand entrance in New Delhi after being less than diplomatic about the Iran conflict feels both petty and less than calculated. Second, Thailand’s motives are more about increasing its own regime legitimacy than building bridges with BRICS to the Global South. Thailand has taken a strong interest in better ties with Russia dating back to Prayut’s engagement with Putin, particularly as it attempted to accelerate post-COVID recovery. Rising anti-China sentiment in Thailand likely indicates that the Kingdom wants an alternative regional partner to Chinese dominance. However, like its ASEAN peers, its bilateral engagements aren’t entirely healthy for ASEAN as a whole.
Last, but not least, it is Marcos who has made the worst calculation. Amid an active and ill-tempered maritime crisis with Beijing in the West Philippine Sea, courting BRICS undermines its cultivation of an enhanced security relationship with Japan, Australia, and the United States.
Without pointing a finger at any one ASEAN member state, the actions of five of its members have consequences for the other six. The US position on China engagement and trade negotiations has been quite clear. Trump once threatened a 150 percent tariff on products from BRICS countries who attempt to undermine dollar dominance. Thailand, now days after the end of the BRICS Summit in India is attempting to close negotiations on a bilateral trade pact ahead of the UN General Assembly in New York. Currently the rate stands at 12.5 percent, but Thailand wants to keep its rates comparable to that of its regional competition. While unlikely, engagement with BRICS should bring nightmares about a return to the brief era of 36 percent tariffs just a year ago.
Moreover, ASEAN member states should be wary about the erosion of its own centrality, particularly in light of its own inability to resolve its internal disputes, seen in the South China Sea and the protracted conflict in Myanmar. This ineptitude has masked ASEAN’s true importance, seen in its collective economic output. That same collective incompetence has eroded the bloc’s ability to steer clear of geopolitical challenges. By sacrificing what remains of its own centrality, ASEAN risks putting peace, security, and economic stability in the hands of outside actors. Thus, attending and courting BRICS makes this even more dangerous.
ASEAN needs to also be wary of the transactional nature of some BRICS members. Russia has been active in courting bilateral arrangements with ASEAN members, seen in Vietnam’s recent visit to Moscow. It’s clear that where Russia has lost its influence elsewhere in the world it has used every opportunity to strengthen its position with ASEAN states, seen in weapons trade with Myanmar and increased regional energy exports. Navigating the trio of Russia, China, and India make ASEAN’s flexible diplomacy far more difficult.
The recent behavior of ASEAN states like the Philippines, who traditionally has been wary of BRICS, was portrayed as “low-risk”, but it could also be terribly shortsighted. In New Delhi, ASEAN states appeared more as individuals than as members of a historic political and economic grouping. What’s best for individual middle and small powers isn’t always the best for a bloc in crisis. It’s outright dangerous.