During Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s recent meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, one of the main topics of discussion was the proliferation of scam centers close to Thailand’s borders in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. Recently, under Chinese pressure, Thailand has initiated a number of measures to combat scam operators in eastern Myanmar, such as tightening visa rules and cutting electricity and fuel from Thailand into Myanmar. After her meeting with Xi, Paetongtarn agreed to “strengthen law enforcement cooperation with China” and take steps to address the crisis of cross-border crime, including online gambling and fraud.
However, in agreeing to additional cooperation with China to combat cross-border crime, there also lies a danger in welcoming additional Chinese influence, which has been growing for years, this time in the form of Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative (GSI). Established in 2022, the GSI has created a framework for addressing issues of mutual concern centered around six fundamental principles, including non-interference, sovereignty, and a belief in “common security.” And while the GSI’s common aims, such as the resolution of conflicts and non-traditional security threats, seem valid, the reorganization of the region’s security along Chinese lines could be problematic for Thailand and wider Southeast Asia.
It’s no secret that Thailand and China have mutually expressed a “brotherhood.” Such language has been used by many past Thai prime ministers. Former Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin called the two nations “blood brothers,” a characterization that was reaffirmed by Paetongtarn during her recent trip to Beijing. As a “family” member, Thailand in November 2022 agreed to explore cooperation with China under the GSI framework. And in the joint statement of February 8, released before Paetongtarn’s departure for Beijing, China again mentioned its desire to “synergize” its development strategies, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the GSI, with Thailand’s own approach to development.
Joint efforts to shut down the scam operations that have proliferated in eastern Myanmar offer one possible test of this growing security cooperation. Oddly, the proliferation of scam centers in Myanmar, mostly operated by Chinese criminal gangs, has been met with a relatively limp response from Thailand, while also largely being neglected by the military junta in Naypyidaw. It was only the recent trafficking of a Chinese actor into neighboring Myanmar that has made scamming a topic of immense concern in both Thailand and China, and prompted a renewed call to action from both sides.
Fears about scams have reportedly deterred Chinese tourists from visiting Thailand, threatening a vital sector of the Thai economy, while Xi remains concerned about the proliferation of transnational crime, raising concerns with Paetongtarn about the connections between criminality and Thailand’s recent push for casinos embedded into “entertainment complexes.”
But while China and Thailand both have an interest in seeing the end of scamming syndicates operating in border areas, the threat of increased Chinese influence over matters of security comes with costs. And given Thailand’s economic dependence on China, particularly in terms of its vital tourism sector, it is harder for Thai leaders to say no to closer security cooperation. In light of recent events, 10,000 Chinese tourists canceled their visits to the Kingdom for the Lunar New Year, according to the Tourism Authority of Thailand, threatening the government’s goal of hosting as many as 40 million international visitors in 2025. This threat to the economically vital tourism sector comes at a time when the Thai economy has stalled due to a combination of factors, including the aftereffects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the country’s stratospheric levels of household debt.
Beyond this, there are a number of unanswered questions about additional security cooperation between Thailand and China, the implications of which extend far beyond scam centers and into other non-traditional areas of security. For instance, what is the next step in joint cooperation? Joint task forces among police? That already happened in 2023, when China, Thailand and Myanmar held a trilateral on human trafficking. What about the boundaries of extradition? China already holds its extradition treaty with Thailand, signed in 1993, in high regard. Would China, through intensified cooperation under the GSI framework, have additional leverage over Uyghur detainees still being held in Thailand?
Perhaps Laos is an extreme example, but consider the case of Lu Siwei, a Chinese human rights lawyer. Lu fled China to Laos, only to end up in the hands of the Chinese authorities. Thailand is already an unsafe place for dissidents. Too much cooperation with Beijing, in the same way it has cooperated with its neighbors, will make it much, much worse.
While China has legitimate worries about non-traditional security threats, it uses this as a pretext to engage in transnational repression of Chinese state critics abroad, often with the active or passive cooperation with foreign governments. Additional cooperation under the umbrella of counter-terrorism and transnational crime could facilitate future deportations at China’s request, as China routinely links the justification of harsh security measures to supposed terrorist activity.
Many of China’s borders, including those with mainland Southeast Asian countries, are porous and difficult to manage. Beijing has made plenty of prior references to “interlocking” threats to its security, and the Chinese Communist Party began to attach “equal importance to internal and external security” back in 2014. Since then, cooperation with Southeast Asian states, particularly those of the lower Mekong region, has grown significantly.
Now, under less-than-ideal circumstances, China is aiming to expand its security umbrella into Thailand with predictable consequences. If its history in the region is any indication, greater security cooperation is an ominous sign for those on the run.
