After a record stint at the helm, Shinzo Abe is resigning as prime minister because of health complications. His departure comes in the middle of an epic security dilemma with China and could signal the end of a long pursuit of constitutional changes that would normalise Japan. His tenure in office can be assessed by assertiveness, pragmatic diplomacy, and the creation of partnerships that have propelled Japan from a reluctant sycophant of American foreign policy priorities to a more “proactive” and reliable regional partner.
Over the course of his 9 years in power, Japan has built robust partnerships with ASEAN member states, on the vast continent of Africa, and with regional powers like India and Australia in pursuit of security, economic development and trade promotion. This brief article chronicles Japan’s ascension to a more formidable middle power under Mr Abe, while highlighting concerns that will preoccupy his successor. Stuck in the era of “chequebook diplomacy”, Japan felt the strain of domestic and capacity restraints, failing to deliver in a meaningful way when its security benefactor, the United States asked for assistance in the Persian Gulf. The trauma of Japan’s non-response in the Gulf led it down a long, winding road to redemption, which would only emerge decades later.
Mr Abe’s predecessors deserve some credit. Japan was always allured by status and prestige, demonstrated in its pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In an attempt to rebuild its image in the eyes of the international community, it used the credibility of its official development assistance (ODA) through its Ticad Conferences and took dramatic steps to increase participation in anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden.
As Mr Abe took power in July of 2006, tensions with China pushed Japan into becoming “proactive” in defence of its national interests and territorial sovereignty. The Chinese first sent surveillance ships around the Senkaku Islands in 2008 and included it in its air defence zone in 2013. The use of “grey zone” strategies in the East China Sea, or regular intrusions by the Chinese Coast Guard, naval vessels, and the Chinese Air Force, as well as conducting military drills beyond the Second Island Chain have caused Japan headaches.
It was Mr Abe’s idea to reconvene an ad hoc group of like-minded states, brought originally together to respond to the 2004 Asian tsunami. It soon served as a best practice of how countries with certain naval capacities could respond to crises in a timely manner. As it evolved into the Quad, short for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, it began to worry Beijing. When Mr Abe stepped down in 2007 for health reasons, the “Quad” disintegrated. A lack of coherence on how to balance against Chinese aggression and growing economic partnerships led to its early demise. Mr Abe’s successor, Yasuo Fukuda, pushed for better relations with China and abandoned Mr Abe’s “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” concept which was too hawkish for pro-China factions within the Foreign Ministry.
When Mr Abe returned in 2012, tensions increased and relations with China have continued to sour, based also on reactions to Chinese treatment of Uighur Muslims, its corrosive Taiwan policy, the implementation of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong, border skirmishes with India, and a protracted trade war with the United States. These circumstances have forced Quad members to project a more united front. In 2016, Mr Abe reiterated his vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific or FOIP, as a set of initiatives to promote Japan’s economic prosperity through the existing rules-based order and improving connectivity between countries. For Japan, FOIP creates partnerships with states that share its values, those that may soon include a more complex military alignment and allow members to respond to multiple crises, such as piracy, terrorism, supply chain protection, natural disasters and the ongoing security dilemma with China.
Under Mr Abe, Japan has built formidable ties to India, an important regional ally, working to increase mutual naval capacities through the Malabar trilateral exercises and the Japan-India Maritime Exercises. Both uphold freedom of navigation and flight, settlement of disputes, and lawful commerce across the Indo-Pacific and have connectivity at the bilateral and multilateral levels, including key areas like technology and infrastructure development.
Mr Abe was capable in trade negotiations, particularly the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Mr Abe’s strong friendship with Narendra Modi is significant as his departure now casts doubt about hopes of convincing New Delhi to rejoin RCEP after its withdrawal in November 2019. Mr Abe also helped Japan rescue TPP after Mr Trump withdrew. Trade diplomacy has become a niche area for Japan, partly as a result of its relationships in the Indo-Pacific.
Elsewhere, Japan has built up bilateral relations with countries of strategic importance, like Djibouti, located at an intersection of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Japan has engaged Sri Lanka as a critical security partner in the Strait of Malacca, inviting Colombo to the Malabar exercises and investing in Sri Lanka’s port infrastructure. Mr Abe’s arrival was the first time a Japanese Prime Minister had visited the island nation in 24 years.
The South China Sea remains critical for Japan. Militarisation and reclamation activities by China are existential security concerns, partially because it is home to vital sea lanes which are crucial to Japan’s economic health. These are also unpredictable times for Japan, particularly with its security benefactor in the United States, who has demanded more from Japan in exchange for security, and has engaged in an isolationist foreign policy. Mr Abe’s departure will leave a hole in Japan’s relationship with Washington, as he and Mr Trump cultivated a personal friendship.
Japan’s domestic constraints remain, as does its struggle with its pacifist identity in the middle of an epic security dilemma. Mr Abe argued repeatedly that an upgrade to the country’s defences was existential, but he ultimately failed as nearly 70% of Japanese are still reluctant to support constitutional changes.
The key questions for Mr Abe’s successor going forward is how to balance responses and pressures. Can Japan continue to expand both its regional aspirations and enhance security through the involvement of South Asian and African partners?
Despite these questions, Japan remains engaged and has ascended as a regional power. Mr Abe’s active engagement with Africa and South Asia have created a rival to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, through infrastructure and technology projects across the Indo-Pacific. While years of passivity had badly damaged Japan’s international reputation, today, it is making the most of the moment. Mr Abe should be given the credit he is due.
