Hong Kong residents are scrambling to pick up the pieces after the implementation of the draconian national security law of 30 June 2020. As China’s new Iron Curtain descended around Hong Kong, pro-democracy activists either fled or were arrested, including media tycoon Jimmy Lai and Demosisto co-founder Agnes Chow. What are the implications of Hong Kong’s gradual but dramatic autocratic transformation?
For China, national trauma helps explain the desire to implement this new law. President Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese dream’ speech delivered after visiting the ‘Road of Rejuvenation’ exhibit in 2012 was illustrative of the national effort to reclaim what was lost from a series of national humiliations, including the Opium Wars, which led to the century-long lease of Hong Kong to the British, and the 1937 Nanking Massacre at the hands of the Japanese. These events form part of the ‘humiliation discourse’ that facilitates China’s preoccupation with hastening Hong Kong’s full return.
After the Sino-British Joint Declaration sealed Hong Kong’s stepped return, China immediately began to undermine it. China claims that the British have no sovereignty over or ‘moral obligation’ to Hong Kong beyond the 1997 handover. Beijing slowly went to work reintegrating the city beyond the scope of the declaration via political and judicial interference.
Hong Kong’s separate identity has played a role. The city became a haven for refugees after communists seized power in China in 1949. As decades passed, generations of Hong Kongers experienced little exposure to the mainland until its reopening from the 1970s. This created a distinct Hong Kong identity, based on capitalism, economic development and connection to the West.
This connectivity created an aura of superiority in Hong Kong. With the handover, anxiety and uncertainty gave way to localism and a distinct ‘peripheral nationalism’. Extreme varieties of localism became decidedly anti-mainland, voicing opposition to the influences of Beijing and placing a greater emphasis on self-determination, democratisation and independence.
China responded to Hong Kong’s expression of identity and growing nationalism by a carrot and stick approach. When attempts in 2003 to pass a national security bill failed due to overwhelming public opposition, China attempted softer approaches, such as the construction of the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge link to mainland China. Hundreds of thousands of mainland Chinese now easily cross into Hong Kong. China also began advocating the cultivation of a national identity for Hong Kong and a greater connection to Chinese history.
Beijing became frustrated with not being able to implement the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment bill, pursued by Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam. The law would have authorised the Hong Kong government to extradite criminal suspects to mainland China. The proposed legislation drew hundreds of thousands into the streets, presenting Xi with a serious challenge.
China portrayed protesters as separatists and accused Western powers of supporting their efforts. This inhospitable environment likely prompted Beijing to explore more dramatic means. China felt constrained by two important factors: the likelihood of additional chaos which would cause further embarrassment to Beijing and legislative elections that were set for September 2020. Without intervention, Hong Kong’s burgeoning democracy movement could have gained additional seats that would block future attempts to pass similar national security legislation.
Learning how to adapt to the new political environment today is complicated. Initial Western reactions were predictable. The European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning China and suggested that the European Union use its economic leverage to challenge China’s crackdown, while urging the passage of Magnitsky-style sanctions on Beijing. The United States ended preferential economic treatment for Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom announced a path to full citizenship for Hong Kong’s remaining pre-handover British National Overseas passport holders.
For China, the future is seated in the narratives of the past. Xi’s pursuit to reclaim lost prestige and control of lost territories by expanding China’s sphere of influence is relentless — evidenced by Beijing’s ongoing actions in the South China Sea.
The United States cannot base its responses on sanctions. States are willing to bear the brunt of sanctions and China’s efforts at economic integration have resulted in the mainland long becoming Hong Kong’s largest trading partner. The West should not penalise Western companies for doing business in Hong Kong — this jeopardises remaining leverage for no gain.
The West needs to focus instead on soft power initiatives to support Hong Kong residents and a growing diaspora. The United States would do well to follow the lead of the United Kingdom in offering Hong Kongers a path to citizenship or residency. Western countries could grant more scholarships and educational opportunities for Hong Kong students with a view to retaining their new skills.
Companies have already been pressured to support the Hong Kong national security law to avoid political conflicts or retaliation from Beijing. Transnational corporations will need to balance pressure from shareholders to condemn China while continuing to operate in an environment where they may be vulnerable.
In these early months anger and frustration are yet to dissipate in Hong Kong. Effective policy responses must be based on both political opportunity, existing linkages and pragmatism. Western responses need to be balanced against increased connectivity with China. This will require patience.
